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SHUTTLE PROCESSING REVIEW TEAM
I. Executive Summary
The intent of this report is to summarize the assessment of the Shuttle processing
operations at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) as requested by the NASA
Administrator. He requested a team re-affirm that safety is our number one priority
and review operations to ensure confidence in the Shuttle processing procedures
at KSC.
It is the opinion of this Review Team that the Space Shuttle Processing is the best
that it has ever been and is continually being evaluated for improvements. Launch
rates have improved, processing times have decreased dramatically, and in-flight
anomalies have decreased. These factors are indicative of a mature and excellent
program. It is the consensus of this Team that safety continues to be the number
one priority in Shuttle processing at KSC.
This Review Team also believes that confidence in the Shuttle processing
operations procedures and personnel is well placed. Management, technicians,
Quality Control and Safety personnel all take tremendous pride in their work and
perform their tasks in an excellent manner. They are creative and constantly think
of ways to perform their job better. The success of the Shuttle Program is a result
of the efforts of thousands of dedicated people. The work is extremely complex
and involves hundreds of thousands of operations that must be done correctly. By
design, the hardware is tolerant of some mistakes, and a degree of risk is accepted
in space flight that something remaining undetected can always occur.
Some perceptions were expressed to the Team by the work force of fear
concerning job security. There is a perception that reporting incidents and mistakes
may result in punitive action and possible loss of employment. This perception may
be the result of recent reductions in force dictated by budget cuts as well as the
sometimes exaggerated reporting of incidents by the media. There is also a
perception that controls effected as the result of problems and incidents are
excessive and have resulted in a slowdown in processing. While the Team found
no evidence to substantiate these perceptions, the fact that they exist should be
addressed. The perceptions do not reflect upper management policies in the area
of reporting incidents and mistakes.
The Shuttle Processing Review Team was appointed by Robert Crippen, Director,
KSC, at the request of the Associate Administrator for Space Flight and charged
with the responsibility to review the circumstances, underlying causes, and
corrective actions taken as a result of recent incidents and close calls during Shuttle
processing at KSC. The Team was further tasked to determine if actions taken are
considered sufficient to prevent problems from recurring.
To establish a baseline and point of reference for this review, the Team examined
the actions taken as the result of the recommendations from a report, entitled
"Assessment of Human Error Incidents at Kennedy Space Center", June 6, 1991.
This report was generated as a result of the findings of a team headed by John W.
Young and is referred to as the "John Young Report". The John Young Report
strongly endorsed the recommendations from a report by J. A. (Gene) Thomas
entitled "Report of the NASA/SPC Committee to Study Incidents", dated July
1990. It is referred to as "the Gene Thomas Report". The Shuttle Processing
Review Team conducted on-site visits and personal interviews to determine if the
recommendations contained in these two reports had been properly implemented
and closed-out.
In addition, the Team reviewed summaries of all mishaps, incidents and close calls
that occurred subsequent to October 1990. The Young Team had addressed those
prior to that date. Specific mishaps were reviewed in detail to identify causes and
corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence. Documentation review, on-site
visits and personal interviews were conducted to determine if corrective actions
were appropriate and had, in fact, been implemented.
The team of technicians, inspectors and engineers at KSC, who are responsible for
our success, were asked to meet with the Team members at their respective work
area without their supervisors being present. The Team asked them to volunteer
their opinions and feelings as to why NASA has been so successful yet incidents
continue to occur. The focus of these sessions was to solicit honest, no-holds-
barred opinions as to why the Shuttle Program has been so highly successful, yet
the people who are responsible for this success also seem to receive
disproportionate criticism whenever a minor incident occurs. The underlying causes
for these incidents and the actions taken as a result of them were also subjects of
discussion. Many of our observations are reflective of the perceptions at the
technician level and are intended to assist the Shuttle Processing Team to further
enhance their enviable record. It was not the intent of this Review Team to cast
doubt on the efficiency and the safe accomplishments of the Shuttle Operations
Team.
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CONCLUSIONS:
The following are the overall conclusions reached by the Team:
1. Safety continues to be the number one priority in Shuttle processing operations
and confidence in processing operations procedures and personnel is well placed.
2. The Shuttle Operations Team has developed a comprehensive methodology to
continuously improve quality while reducing labor costs. Some areas observed
seemed to excel in continuous improvement more than others and are models to
emulate. The Orbiter tile shop, the tire shop, the Hypergolic Maintenance Facility
(HMF) and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) processing areas are considered
examples. Teamwork, new efficiencies in operations, facility improvements and
automation techniques have been combined to result in record processing quantities
with continuing improvement in quality and a low incidence of mishaps.
3. The underlying causes for recent incidents and close calls during Shuttle
processing at KSC as determined through a review of documentation is attributable
to human factors, equipment failures and procedures. The predominant causes
(66%) of all mishaps is human factors. For flight hardware incidents human factors
were responsible for 32% of the mishaps and procedures caused 26% of the
mishaps. The actions taken as result of these incidents were reviewed in detail.
The corrective actions in most cases were determined to be adequate and had, in
fact, been implemented. However, in some cases, implementation was still in
process or budget restrictions and revised methods of operation were stated to be
the reason for not implementing the recommendations.
4. The recommendations of the John Young Report and the Gene Thomas Report
have not been fully implemented in all areas. These were recommendations and
not directives. The degree of implementation is subject to management judgement
and recognized is the fact that NASA policies, budgets, and management systems
have changed since these recommendations were made.
5. The Team concluded that multi-discipline team building has improved; however,
there is a need to expand it to all areas. The task team leader concept, including
the training and assignment of dedicated technicians and quality control personnel
is not yet complete. Engineering support to the work site needs to be readdressed.
Efficiencies achieved in non-critical operations have placed even more responsibility
for the quality of the work on the technicians performing the task. Systems are in
place to reward special performance and accomplishments. However, because of
reductions in force and recent disciplinary actions associated with incidents that
received disproportionate media attention, there is a perception that has developed
among the work force that making mistakes results in punitive action. There is a
fear that noted mistakes will lead to loss of employment. Therefore, there is a
tendency to not report problems, close calls and incidents because of the of the
fear of reprisal. The Review Team found no evidence that disciplinary action was
taken inappropriately.
6. Some NASA and SPC technicians and Quality Control personnel desire more
detailed knowledge of systems and subsystems to which they are assigned to
verify procedural compliance. Some Quality Control personnel interviewed
expressed concern that their areas of responsibility are too broad. Concerns were
also expressed relative to lack of involvement by quality inspectors in generating
processing paper and planning tasks to be accomplished. The pilot Structured
Surveillance Program is complete and full implementation is in process. However,
some inconsistencies and misinterpretations were expressed by the technicians and
quality control personnel. Corrosion inspection requirements in the OMRSD are
being met; however, deficiencies were noted in the adequacy of the process used
to detect corrosion on the Orbiter.
7. Not all Design Center(s), CIL and Hazard acceptance criteria involved in KSC
processing are "linked" to the OMRS creating the potential for an oversight during
selection of inspection requirements in work authorization documents. A change
request approved by the Program Manager allowed deletion of CIL and Hazard
related inspection requirements in the OMRSD if defined by released engineering.
8. The category "A" mishap on the fuel cell resulted in an Investigation Board
Report with 26 recommendations. The Team found the documentation for closeout
of the recommendations reflected satisfactory rationale, but the corrective action
implementation requires reevaluation and documentation update to reflect
management decisions.
9. Some personnel feel their concerns about hazards are not being addressed.
Workers in Orbiter aft compartment indicated concerns with lighting and noise
levels. SCAPE suit problems continue to occur. Although significant management
attention has been placed on SCAPE suits, some of the work force feel that known
design deficiencies have not been adequately corrected. Close calls were stated
to have occurred which have not been reported.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The Team assessed the results of their review and developed the overall
recommendations summarized below:
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1. Management should continue to be a positive influence on safety improvements
and continue to respond to the constant challenge of communicating with the work
force to ensure perceptions accurately reflect management policies. Top
management, mid-level managers and first-line supervisors need to continue to
communicate with their subordinates to allay their fears that reporting problems,
close calls and mistakes leads to reprisals and disciplinary action.
2. KSC and SPC management should study closely the areas of excellence that
have evidenced themselves and capture the lessons learned and successes
achieved in order to apply these successful techniques to all processing operations.
3. KSC and SPC should establish additional continuous improvement teams to
investigate root causes for incidents and problems attributable to human factors.
Feedback should be solicited from the work force as to solutions for problems.
4. The SPC closures for the recommendations of both the John Young Report and
the Gene Thomas Report need to be reassessed by NASA to see if they are still
applicable and reflect the current Agency directions. If they are found to be
applicable, they should continue to be implemented and regular audits should be
performed to assure compliance. If found to be not applicable, the closeout reports
should be amended to reflect the current policies of operation.
5. Multi-discipline team building needs to continue to be implemented, especially
in the VAB and at the launch pads. The task team leader concept, the on-site
engineering support and the dedicated technician and inspector approach need to
be integrated into an overall strategy for critical operations. KSC management,
both NASA and contractor, should continue to do as much as possible to provide
an environment that encourages integrated teamwork and cooperation between the
various organizations on-site.
6. NASA and SPC should continue to review and update their training and
certification programs for technicians and quality control personnel. Quality
personnel should have adequate involvement in generating the processing paper
and planning the tasks to be accomplished. KSC should assure that quality
inspectors have appropriate training in critical systems. Emphasis must be placed
on each individual stamp as a warranty that the work was performed correctly.
The system used to identify areas in need of in-depth quality audits or increased
surveillance could be improved. Improved trend analysis, in addition to trend
reporting, would be beneficial to help identify recurring problem areas requiring
corrective action. The requirements for in-depth corrosion inspection criteria need
to be reviewed by the Design Center. Training and certification should be improved
appropriately.
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7. To preserve the integrity of risk assessment and risk management activities,
Space Shuttle program management must ensure that KSC Operations and
Maintenance Requirements Specifications Document (OMRSD) derived from CIL or
Hazard Report acceptance rationale are properly identified to ensure independent
inspection, closed-loop accounting of work completion, and proper application.
NASA JSC, KSC and Space Shuttle program management should determine the
validity of the KSC situation. If similar situations exist at Design Center
contractors' plants, they should initiate corrective action as soon as possible. The
Shuttle Program Manager (JSC) should reassess the impact of the Change Request
that deleted OMRSD requirements that are defined by released engineering.
8. The process for verifying implementation of recommendations in mishap
investigation reports needs to be reviewed to assure corrective actions documented
in the closeouts are effected.
9. NASA and SPC should continue to address concerns about hazards held by
personnel working in the Orbiter aft compartment to assure they are given proper
visibility and are aggressively pursued. The Design Center should assist in these
efforts by considering design changes that would reduce the noise level from the
purge air system. NASA and SPC need to continue to address the cause for the
incidents on SCAPE suits. Communication between SCAPE Operations and Life
Support personnel need to be improved. A means should be established to flag
trends and resolve issues such as the number of SCAPE problems. Management
needs to evaluate the system for reporting close calls to assure employee
participation is not discouraged and safety concerns are properly addressed.
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SHUTTLE PROCESSING REVIEW TEAM
DETAILED REPORT
A. INTRODUCTION
The NASA Administrator requested the Associate Administrator, Office of Space
Flight (OSF), re-affirm that safety is our number one priority. He recommended
Robert Crippen establish a team to ensure continuing confidence in the Shuttle
processing procedures at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). (Enclosure 1)
Robert Crippen appointed Richard U. Perry, NASA Headquarters, Director, Space
Flight Safety and Mission Assurance Division, to chair a team to conduct this
review. (Enclosure 2) Team members included:
Roger Mielec
Manager, Systems Effectiveness, Headquarters Safety Division
NASA Headquarters
Ken Colley
Headquarters Manager, Space Shuttle Operations Integration
Kennedy Space Center
Hector Delgado
Systems Assurance Office
Kennedy Space Center
Major Andrew Allen, USMC
Astronaut Office
Johnson Space Center
John Starnes
Aviation Safety Office
Johnson Space Center
George Jarrell
Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance Division
Johnson Space Center
Ken Jones
RSRM Chief Engineer
Marshall Space Flight Center
Paul Teehan
Safety and Mission Assurance Representative
Marshall Space Flight Center Resident Office,
Kennedy Space Center
Linder Metts
Project Assurance Office
Marshall Space Flight Center
Lon Miller
Manager, ASRM Project Office
Stennis Space Center
SUPPORT TEAM MEMBERS:
Syd England
Loral Corporation
SSP SR&QA Resident Office/
Kennedy Space Center
Janet Cipolletti
Loral Corporation
SSP SR&QA Resident Office/
Kennedy Space Center
Ben Weil
Loral Corporation
SR&QA Support Office/
Johnson Space Center
Mary Ann Turner
Recording Secretary
Kennedy Space Center
Ettie Karpman
Recording Secretary
Space Flight S&MA Division
NASA Headquarters
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1. OBJECTIVE
The Charter for the Team stated the objective as: "Review the circumstances,
underlying causes and corrective actions taken as the result of recent incidents and
close calls during Shuttle processing at the KSC to determine if actions taken are
considered sufficient to prevent problems from reoccurring."
2. APPROACH
The Team was to review Shuttle processing incidents, close calls, surveys, audits
and significant problem reports to ascertain if previously recommended corrective
measures were appropriate and effectively implemented. They were to review
selected current Shuttle processing procedures and determine if they are
appropriate to prevent similar problems. Finally, the Team was asked to develop
conclusions and provide recommendations for system or procedural improvements.
B. BACKGROUND
On June 6, 1991, a report entitled "Assessment of Human Error Incidents at
Kennedy Space Center" was issued by the Associate Administrator, Office of
Space Flight. The report summarized an assessment of human error incidents at
KSC which was conducted by a team headed by John W. Young. The assessment
team was requested to categorize and summarize the incidents and determine if
there appeared to be a pattern to their occurrences. The team was also requested
to recommend standards and criteria that should be used to assess whether the
number of incidents was excessive. Using these standards, they were to assess
whether KSC was doing as well as they should and determine what could be done
to lower the frequency of such incidents.
The assessment team focused on human error incidents in Shuttle processing
operations which occurred between July 1, 1989, and October 5, 1990. A total
of 216 reported mishaps/incidents and 69 close calls were documented during this
period. The assessment team did not observe any condition or concerns that were
materially different from findings of earlier investigation boards. They did not find
an available set of indices from which to judge quality performance and trends on
a macro scale, but the team made a recommendation that the KSC/Shuttle
Processing Contractor (SPC) processing team establish a methodology/process for
"bench marking" this experience base and measuring improvements against this
"bench mark". The report provided six specific recommendations. The Shuttle
Processing Review team was asked by the Chairman to review the actions taken
as a result of the John Young Report and determine if those actions had been
implemented. The SPC response, dated July 19, 1991, summarized the actions
that were taken or were in the process of being implemented.
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The John Young Report also referred to a report of the NASA SPC Committee to
study incidents, chaired by J. A. (Gene) Thomas, KSC Deputy Center Director, in
July 1990. The John Young assessment team found the "Thomas Study" to
represent a comprehensive, thorough effort and recommended that KSC and the
SPC provide a plan of action and specific initiatives to address those
recommendations. On June 4, 1991, the SPC reported closure of all the actions.
C. FOLLOW-UP VERIFICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1. John Young Report
Recommendation #1
During the period October 1, 1989, to September 30, 1990, the John Young
Report indicated 216 mishap/incidents and 69 close calls were reported. The
report recommended increased emphasis be placed on reporting close calls.
Analysis of mishaps in the MR/CAS database for the period October 5, 1990 to
April 30, 1993, shows that 612 mishaps occurred. Of this total, 177 were
classified as close call mishaps. The proportion of close calls to total mishaps on
a monthly basis has become more random, but is generally 29% of total mishaps
for this time period.
The SPC has a separate reporting system for mishaps, incidents and close calls.
A Preliminary Evaluation Report (PER) is prepared for unplanned events or
conditions that qualify or are suspected of qualifying as a mishap, incident or close
call. The PER's are submitted to the Incident/Error Review Board (IERB) for review,
evaluation, tracking and determining appropriate corrective actions and
dispositioning. NASA mishap reports are initiated when appropriate.
Although increased emphasis has been placed on reporting close calls, the Team
found there was a hesitancy and genuine unwillingness at the technician level to
report mistakes and close calls for fear of disciplinary action. They sincerely believe
that reporting an incident may, and probably will, result in disciplinary action
including dismissal. No evidence was found by the Review Team where disciplinary
action was taken inappropriately. Management needs to continue to communicate
with their subordinates to allay their fears that reporting incidents and close calls
leads to reprisals and disciplinary action.
Recommendation #2
The report recommended an engineering, manufacturing, quality, and safety team
be formed to analyze the causes and handling of human errors.
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An Incident Error Review Board (IERB) was formed by the SPC. The IERB, which
is chaired by SPC SRM&QA analyzes all incident (PER) causes. There have been
135 occurrences that qualified as requiring submittal to the IERB since April 1991.
Of these, 105 or 78% were attributed to human factors such as "human error",
"failure to follow procedure", or "inattention".
Some analysis of the causes of human errors have been accomplished. However,
the Team concluded more work is required before this recommendation is fully
implemented. The percentage of Preliminary Evaluation Reports (PER's) attributable
to human factors still requires an in-depth analysis by NASA and the contractors
to determine underlying causes. A continuous improvement team should focus on
determining root causes for human errors.
Recommendation #3
The Young Report recommended NASA KSC and the SPC form a team to develop
a comprehensive methodology including standards, criteria and measurement
indices which will allow KSC/SPC to measure overall quality improvement
achievements and trends with a goal of seeking continuous improvement.
The team found that NASA KSC and the SPC had initiated an active Total Quality
Management/Continuous Improvement Process Program with a series of
measurement indices that are used to indicate quality. The number of problems per
1000 direct labor hours are portrayed by department. The number of NASA Quality
Surveillance Reports (QSR's) are also tracked as a measure of SPC performance.
The SPC performance evaluation takes into account some of these indices in
determining the award fee.
Overall performance is indicated by the success of the operations team. In the last
year, May 1992 through April 1993, the KSC team successfully launched nine
Shuttle missions (STS-46, STS-47, STS-49, STS-50, STS-52, STS-53, STS-54,
STS-56 and STS-55). STS-55 was delayed due to engine pump problems at the
factory, a hydraulic hose rupture and range conflicts. The March 22 launch
attempt of STS-55 was scrubbed at T-3 seconds due to an engine valve problem.
A second scrub on April 6 at T-11 seconds occurred on STS-56 because of a faulty
MPS sensor, but STS-56 was successfully launched 2 days later on April 8, and
STS-55 was successfully launched on April 22. The KSC launch team successfully
safed the vehicle after the March 22 abort and evacuated the crew after the engine
shutdown at the launch pad. This was an outstanding demonstration on the part
of the crew, the launch team and the systems. The Shuttle Program Manager and
the OSF Associate Administrator commended the team for their superb handling of
the shutdown. The total number of in-flight anomalies for each mission by vehicle
has declined. During the last three missions, a total of 41 in-flight anomalies were
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recorded. This is an average of 1.76 anomalies per flight day, well below the
previous average. None of these anomalies were attributed to ground processing.
Both LSOC and Thiokol were awarded the prestigious NASA Excellence Award for
Quality in 1992. This award is based on demonstrated excellence and outstanding
quality.
In an effort to help the Program and the Agency meet projected budget reductions
of 15 percent by 1998, KSC analyzed current processing requirements, and over
the last 2 years has made significant reductions in processing times. Reductions
in the direct labor work force have been achieved while process improvements and
new innovations such as the structured surveillance quality assurance program have
improved process efficiency. Recent problems with the SSME configuration at
Canoga Park have necessitated pulling engines from all vehicles and recycling them
through the KSC engine shop for component replacement, retest and reinstallation.
The speed and efficiency of these changeouts was due in part to the process
improvements. The Team concluded that KSC and the SPC have developed a
comprehensive methodology to continuously improve quality while reducing labor
costs and processing time to comply with budget reductions.
Recommendation #4
The Young Report recommended the KSC/Shuttle Processing Team increase the
management emphasis on communicating the importance of quality and safety as
job elements and on improving management worker awareness of quality trends.
The Shuttle Operations Review Team found strong involvement of management in
promoting quality and safety. The SPC contractor was awarded the NASA Safety
Award of Distinction in 1992.
The Young Committee also recommended that multi-discipline team building efforts
be increased to improve quality personnel ownership of their work. The launch site
directorate established a task team concept that identifies a task leader for flight
element work tasks. The task leader was to be the recognized expert for the task
to be performed and members of the team were to be assigned specific
responsibilities; i.e., quality, safety, etc. (SPC, SPI SP-OO6(2)K). Discussions with
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) and launch pad personnel resulted in the
conclusion that the team leader concept is not being fully implemented in all areas.
Under the team leader concept, Quality Control (QC) is required to "provide
appropriately trained (and certified as required) personnel to support scheduled
work tasks". Launch pad and VAB personnel stated that the SPC QC personnel
understand the system and work to be performed but the NASA QC's are not as
familiar with operations and are not as well trained in the systems. However, the
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ratio of NASA inspectors to contractor inspectors requires a more general
knowledge of a broad area of the operations they must cover.
The Shuttle Operations Review Team recommends the training/certification program
continue to be reviewed to assure that it provides adequate systems knowledge
and skills required to perform QC and Safety tasks. This training should culminate
in a stand-board where candidates would be required to demonstrate their
expertise.
The SPC contractor response to Recommendation #4 also stated that technicians
and Quality Control personnel have been identified and assigned for dedicated
support on specific Space Shuttle systems. This is being applied on a limited basis.
This Team reiterates the Young Committee recommendation that multi-discipline
team building efforts be increased in the VAB and at the launch pad and continue
to be implemented. It is recognized that increased efficiencies and costs saving
measures have been achieved throughout the Space Shuttle processing operations.
Also recognized is the fact that this was achieved, in large part, by having the
ability to assign skillful technicians to perform a wide variety of tasks within a
broad technical field. Without question, the NASA KSC management approach to
dealing with risk has been most successful. The complexity of the work and the
number of critical operations performed mandate the assignment of well-trained
technicians and inspectors. With the possibility of further cost reductions, the
number of people who perform Shuttle processing will have to be further reduced.
NASA KSC management must continue to analyze the impact of reductions and
determine when resources reach a critical limit.
Recommendation #5
The John Young Team recommended the KSC/SPC processing team undertake a
series of reviews, assessments and procedure changes to improve a number of
aspects of the work process. These involved reviewing work authorization
documents to assure appropriate caution and safety notes were clearly
communicated to the users.
The Young Report also recommended the signatures for work documents be limited
to those who actually participated in the activity or were directly responsible for
their accuracy/integrity. The SPC response stated that KSC had adopted a
signature philosophy for work documents limiting approvals to those who are
responsible for their accuracy/integrity. The implementation of this philosophy was
outlined in a three phased approach that has reduced KSC, LSS and SPC signatures
and resulted in significantly reduced approval times.
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The Launch Site Support (LSS) review is limited to verification of proper
implementation of design requirements. LSS personnel stated that on several
occasions after the fact review resulted in their conclusion that the paper should
have been signed by the design center representative because the problems
appeared to involve the design.
The Review Team recommends NASA KSC, MSFC and JSC reassess the current
procedures for distributing copies of processing paper to allow timely and
appropriate review by LSS personnel.
The Thomas Committee also recommended SPC expedite the use of bar coding and
computerized scheduling systems to facilitate productivity in documentation, work
flow and test team activity.
The SPC has developed the SPDMS-II system which permits the bar codes of
equipment that facilitates tracking by location and user. The system also permits
tracking of parts scheduled for preventive maintenance, calibration and proof
loading. Work Authorization Documents have also been successfully coded. The
system is operational in the HMF, in the tile shop and is being expanded to many
other areas as well. The system is being tried out on a pilot basis in other areas;
however, to assure accountability, the manual system of logging this equipment on
Temporary Installation Records (TIR's) is also being maintained.
Recommendation #6
The Young Report recommendation said, work assignment for quality control
personnel should be reviewed to ensure that the quality oversight function for
complex tasks is performed by specifically qualified personnel who fully understand
the activity being performed. The report stated that NASA and contractor
personnel needed to be qualified specifically for the activity being monitored. The
report reiterated a finding from the Atlantis Fuel Cell Mishap Investigation Board
Report: "Quality inspectors are not given inspection work based upon their
knowledge or previous inspection assignments. They respond to a call board that
lists tasks calling for an inspector, consequently, an inspector appears in somewhat
indiscriminate fashion to perform the inspection task."
The Shuttle Processing Team reviewed the documentation for closeout and found
the fuel cell investigation report closeouts reflected satisfactory rationale.
However, through on-site visits and personal interviews it was determined the call
board system continues to be used and that the recommendation was in fact not
implemented as stated.
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This Team recommends that NASA revisit the Young recommendation and continue
to assess the training of quality control personnel to assure Quality inspectors have
appropriate training in critical system. Specialized people should be assigned to the
multi-discipline teams to assure teamwork approach.
2. Gene Thomas Report
In July 1990, the Thomas Committee was formed to conduct a study of incident
causes and make recommendations to alleviate potential deficient conditions. The
Shuttle Processing Review Team reviewed the letter from the Lockheed Space
Operations Company (LSOC) to NASA KSC, dated June 4, 1991. The enclosure
to the letter listed all corrective actions taken on each of the recommendations of
the Thomas Committee. The Review Team conducted investigations of operations
to verify implementation of the LSOC responses.
Recommendation #1
The Thomas Committee recommended a responsible task leader be clearly defined
for every work task. LSOC responded that a task team leader implementation plan
had been completed and 1800 LSOC and NASA technicians/engineers had
completed training.
The Review Team found that implementation of the task team leader concept varies
depending on the hardware system involved and the Shuttle processing area. In
the OPF, the task team leader concept has been implemented. However, in the
VAB and at the launch pad they have not been fully implemented. The Shuttle
Processing Instruction lends itself to interpretation.
The Team concluded that multi-discipline team building has improved; however, the
task team leader implementation is not yet complete in all Shuttle processing areas.
It is recommended that NASA and SPC identify areas where the plan has been
implemented successfully and evaluate each for the most effective means of
implementation. The SPI should be reviewed and revised to eliminate areas of
ambiguity. Engineering, Quality Control, technicians and the task team leader
should review the floor paper together and contribute to the rewrite of the
procedures to improve understanding and assure better communication. A
performance training program similar to those conducted in other areas should be
conducted and geared to specific areas of responsibility. Certifications should be
conducted on a periodic basis and should be included in system level training on
critical system where appropriate.
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Recommendation #2
The Thomas Committee recommended first and second level supervisors share
responsibility/discipline for "lack of discipline" or "failure to perform" incidents.
The LSOC response states that incidents had been examined and results show an
equitable distribution of responsibility/discipline were being administered.
Interviews with technicians on all three shifts clearly indicated it is their perception
that mistakes/incidents/close calls result in punitive action to them alone. They
stated they are usually all alone to "face the music". Therefore, they have a
hesitancy to report mistakes and close calls. They stated that these incidents may
go unreported unless they feel it could impair the safety of the vehicle/crew or it
cannot be hidden. Punitive action is perceived as management reaction and results
in disciplinary action and isolation of the individuals concerned. This is followed by
overreaction when new procedures and verification programs are introduced.
The Team recommends NASA and the SPC continue to communicate the current
policies and procedures for discipline with all employees. Improved
communications between management and workers should encourage the reporting
of close calls and voluntary admission of simple errors/mistakes. Workers should
be positively recognized when they come forward and report an incident. For
example, the technician who dropped a pair of duck-billed pliers in the Orbiter aft
compartment (just after all the notoriety over the pliers that were found on the
booster) immediately reported the incident even though his pliers were recovered.
He should be commended for reporting this incident and assuring all flight hardware
was inspected.
Recommendation #3
This recommendation stated, SPC should promote a higher standard of teamwork
at all working levels.
The SPC and NASA have conducted senior led "all hands" meetings to convey the
benefits of teamwork. Continuous improvement teams have been established in
numerous disciplines. The task team leader concept was initiated. However, after
hearing presentations from the various organizations at KSC (NASA, LSOC, LSS,
Thiokol, Rocketdyne, etc.), the Team concluded that some organizations and
contractors view themselves as separate entities.
The Team recommends that KSC management (NASA and contractors) continue
to do as much as possible to provide an environment that encourages integrated
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teamwork and cooperation among the various NASA, contractor, and SPC
organizations on-site.
Recommendation #4
KSC was asked by the Thomas Committee to institute quality improvement teams
which were representative of the work areas and that focus on incident
susceptibility, accident prevention and job quality. The Shuttle Processing Team
verified that KSC and the SPC have in place an excellent continuous improvement
plan and focused teams have been chartered. Obvious results have been achieved
in process improvement and cost reduction.
NASA KSC and SPC have made significant progress in implementing a continuous
improvement program. The Launch Site Operations contractor has over 400 active
teams. All team activity is connected to the overall goals and objectives. Regular
status reviews are held to measure progress. Demonstrated results are measured
in terms of cost and time savings. Charts are posted in the areas depicting process
improvement team progress. Significant cost and time savings have been achieved.
Recommendation #5
The Thomas Committee recommended additional engineering personnel support the
work site on a more frequent basis. They suggested a general listing of work tasks
be generated to be covered continuously by engineering personnel (SPC and NASA)
at the work site.
The task team leader concept was to be employed to further enhance engineering
availability at the work site. A detailed listing of engineering tasks to support the
critical flow in the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) was published and an increased
number of engineers were identified to support OPF processing. However, the
recommendation was not carried out in all areas, especially the VAB and launch
pads. Throughout our interviews, the technicians expressed a desire for more
engineering support on the floor.
The effects of reduced budgets and subsequent personnel reductions first affected
support organizations such as engineering. Shop labor was preserved during the
first rounds until efficiencies could be identified.
KSC conducted an extensive review of the number of personnel reviewing and
signing paperwork. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between
KSC, the design center and prime contractor launch site support organizations. The
number of approvals by LSS engineers was greatly reduced. Thus, continuous
coverage by LSS engineering at the work site has been reduced in some areas.
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The Team recommends NASA KSC, NASA JSC, NASA MSFC and the SPC
contractors reassess the total engineering support provided to the work site.
Recommendation #6
The Thomas Report recommended that specific hardware systems be selected and
dedicated, trained technicians and inspectors be assigned to these systems.
The SPC response stated that technicians and quality control personnel have been
identified and assigned for dedicated support on specific Space Shuttle systems.
After being cross-trained and on-the-job trained, they will also become backup
specialists on additional systems.
The Team found that technicians are dedicated to a specific area of the Orbiter on
a specific shift and are usually assigned to a specific Orbiter Processing Facility
(OPF) bay. Certain technicians in each crew are further specialized by mechanical
and electrical skills. There are approximately 12 Orbiter systems and each system
has six to eight technicians assigned. An individual may be assigned to as few as
three, but not more than five, specific areas. The supervisor and the task team
leader are given latitude to assign technicians and should be knowledgeable of their
certifications and monitor and evaluate their performance.
While the SPC had made progress in implementing this recommendation, they have
been faced with reducing costs and therefore reducing the number of people who
perform Shuttle processing. With over 3000 people who execute over one million
procedure steps per mission flow or otherwise interface with the hardware, the
recommendation is extremely difficult to achieve. Such an approach for all systems
and operations may be impractical from an efficiency/cost point of view. However,
critical systems and operations require consistent and accurate execution of the
tasks to maintain safety and reliability. Therefore, NASA and contractor
management need to be assertive during proposed reductions and maintain the
dedicated technicians and quality control personnel they have in place on critical
systems. Efficiencies achieved in non-critical applications such as the reevaluation
of inspection requirements and the structured surveillance program have in essence
placed even more responsibility for the quality of work on technicians performing
the task.
The Team recommends NASA KSC reevaluate this Thomas recommendation and
revise the direction to the Shuttle operations team to reflect the current policies in
effect under reduced budgets and new efficiencies in operations that have been
implemented. The task team leader reevaluation (Recommendation #1 ), the on-site
engineering support (Recommendation #5) and the dedicated technician and
inspector approach (Recommendation #6) need to be integrated into an overall
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management approach for Shuttle processing operations. The top down operation
plan should map out the strategies for critical and non-critical operations and
establish measures of effectiveness for each in terms of reduced incidents, time
required for accomplishment, cost avoidance, job satisfaction, and team
effectiveness. More emphasis on operations is especially needed in the VAB and
at the launch pads.
Recommendation #7
The Thomas Report recommended that SPC investigate means of further rewarding
special performances.
The SPC initiated several systems of rewards for accomplishment which are
presented at the work site, in the company of fellow employees and as close as
possible to the completion of task.
The Team concluded the intent of this recommendation is being met. Continued
emphasis must be placed on this area in spite of current and future budgetary
restrictions.
Recommendation #8
The Thomas Committee said "management must continually re-affirm the
importance of task performance in compliance with the written procedure". They
recommended the KSC Center Director and the SPC Program Manager issue a letter
to all Shuttle employees affirming the commitment "in no case will schedule
prevent taking adequate time to safely do a quality job".
The reaffirmation is accomplished through all-hands briefings and tailgate meetings,
Shuttle status bulletins, quarterly meetings, supervisor meetings and in training
courses. SPC senior management further reinforces this need through personal
contact and taped video messages.
The KSC Center Director, General Forrest McCartney, issued the recommended
letter on November 27, 1990, and SPC management issued a memo signed by
D. Sargent, President of Lockheed Space Operations Company, on November 30,
1990.
The Team concluded this recommendation was implemented and continues to be
affirmed by the current KSC Center Director, SPC Program Manager and senior
management.
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Recommendation #9
This Thomas recommendation simply stated "every effort should be made to
enhance scheduling"
The closeout cited an intensive number of reorganizations, critical resource loading
analysis, working groups, schedule development improvements and work control
measures that had been developed and were ongoing.
The launch rates achieved and record flow times that reflect significant reductions,
combined with the decline in mission in-flight anomalies and good safety
performance, speak for themselves. To accomplish this record of management of
the most complex operations in the world, while reducing costs to comply with
budgetary reductions, reflects the spirit and dedication of KSC, NASA and the
contractor team.
This Team did not evaluate this recommendation in detail regarding scheduling.
Interviews resulted in the overall conclusion that operations employees attempt to
achieve schedules and are innovative in identifying ways to more efficiently perform
the work. They are not, however, reluctant to stop the work whenever they are
unsure or feel the situation may jeopardize flight safety.
Recommendation #10
This recommendation by the Thomas Committee was that the SPC should establish
a weekly newsletter to be distributed to every Shuttle employee.
The SPC established a biweekly newsletter that is published by the Office of the
Launch Site Director and is titled, "Shuttle Team News". This communication is
designed to create a better informed work force.
D. INCIDENTS REVIEWED FOR ADEQUACY OF CORRECTIVE ACTION
The following specific problems, mishaps, incidents and close calls were reviewed
to identify causes and corrective actions taken to preclude recurrence.
Documentation review, on-site visits and personal interviews were conducted to
determine if corrective measures were appropriate and had been effectively
implemented. Conclusions and recommendations are summarized.
1. STS-56 LOST/FOUND PLIERS INCIDENT
During STS-56 post flight Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) disassembly operations on
April 10, 1993, at Hangar AF on the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, a pair of
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diagonal cutting pliers fell to the ground as the right SRB was being rotated. The
pliers were in the vicinity of the number four hold-down post area of the aft skirt.
On closer investigation, rust stains indicated the pliers had been wedged between
the booster blast retainer and the aft skirt. They remained there during launch and
subsequent booster recovery operations. The area is difficult to see and inspect
prior to launch.
A NASA Mishap Report (Number 93-022) was initiated by Thiokol Corporation and
reported to NASA Safety. Launch pad B supervision immediately began an
investigation when notified by the SRB disassembly team. Documentation showed
that cutting pliers were last used on April 1, 1993, when the blast container
fasteners were Iockwired. A tool box inventory at the end of the shift on April 1
did not disclose the missing pliers. An inspection of the area around the blast
containers had been conducted per OMI B5306 task 10-008 on April 2, 1993, on
second shift, and the lost pliers had not been noted. The pliers were discovered
missing during an inventory at 3:30 p.m., April 2, 1993, by a Thiokol supervisor.
The SPI requires the supervisor to initiate a Lost Tool Report; however, as specified
in SPI QA-O01(3)K, the supervisor failed to initiate a report. He also failed to report
the lost tool to his management. Although a closeout inspection had been
conducted prior to flight, the inspection failed to find anything out of configuration.
Witness statements by the second shift technician and second shift inspector that
performed the closeout stated that access was very limited and it was also dark at
the time of inspection. A flashlight was used to perform the inspection. The
inspector verified the Iockwire on hold-down post #4 on April 1, second shift, but
stated he did not see a pair of pliers behind or around the hold-down post. He
returned on April 2 and inspected around all blast containers on the left and right
boosters and did not see a pair of pliers. The inspector stated the area in question
around hold-down post number 4 has very limited access. Pick boards and purge
lights had been removed and blast shields had been installed. The inspection was
done at night with a mirror and flashlights. They had not been informed of the
missing pliers.
Corrective actions taken as a result of discovering the lost pliers and finding no
documentation had been initiated as required and included:
1. A complete physical inventory of all Shuttle work area tool boxes was
performed with only minor discrepancies noted and no flight concerns.
2. STS-55 aft skirt area was totally reinspected using improved access and lighting
enhancement.
21
3. The ET/SRB physical inspection areas were reviewed for accessibility/visibility
and areas requiring improvement were modified.
4. A bulletin was issued and management sessions were held with all Operations
and Quality personnel to review tethering requirements, lost tool reporting criteria
and tool box inventories.
5. Disciplinary action was imposed on the supervisor for his lack of reporting the
lost tool.
Corrective actions were deemed appropriate by the Team and ongoing
improvements in tool control should preclude recurrence. However, because tool
control problems had been noted for the preceding year by NASA Quality Control,
additional measures are required.
On January 6, 1993, the midpoint evaluation (October-December 1992) report for
the Award fee for the Shuttle Processing Contractor, the Director, Safety,
Reliability and Quality Assurance stated, "Quality surveillances at the pad indicate
Thiokol is not in compliance with tool control requirements. Although progress is
being made, similar surveillances in the VAB indicate the same violations. In both
areas, improvement methods should receive the utmost attention."
However, the April 5, 1993, Evaluation Report stated, "In OPF Bay 3, there were
seven instances documented for tool accountability problems and four for tool out-
of-calibration. During this reporting period, there have been three Quality
Deficiency Notices (QDN's) issued addressing problems with tool control.
Continued Management attention is required to assure tool boxes are in compliance
with the tool control program." "Thiokol tool control continues to be a problem in
the VAB. Examples of non-conformances are: (1) tools not identified, (2) tools
improperly stored, and (3) lack of periodic tool box audits. Previous reports failed
to resolve this problem; thus resulting in the issuance of a QDN."
The Team recommends contractor management be more responsive in taking action
as a result of NASA evaluations that cite repeated deficiencies.
This incident, although it caused no damage to flight hardware or injury to
operations personnel, received disproportionate media attention. During testimony
to the House Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space and
Technology on April 27, 1993, Chairman Hall (D-TX) presented a list of problem
areas as he saw them which included "recent minor but bothersome quality control
problems in the Space Shuttle program". Major General Pearson detailed the teams
he had put in place to solve specific problems and noted appropriate action had
been taken regarding the pliers left in the aft skirt.
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Although unfortunate that the pliers incident became the object of much criticism
of the Agency, it is considered fortunate that they were discovered and the
systems in place to discover missing tools and report them were reassessed and
strengthened. This Review Team examined the tool control program in all Shuttle
processing areas, and section E summarizes the results.
2. FUEL CELL INCIDENT
On April 4, 1990, one of the three fuel cells (#3) in Atlantis was damaged during
an attempt to vent the fuel cell prior to its removal. The Orbiter hydrogen (H 2)
purge vent port was erroneously capped. This allowed the H 2 pressure to exceed
the oxygen (02) pressure in the fuel cell causing migration of corrosive potassium
hydroxide (KOH) water solution throughout the 02 side of the fuel cell. No one was
injured and repair costs were estimated to be approximately $3.1M.
Capping the purge vent port was a result of good shop practice to prevent
contamination and test personnel were not aware that the cap was on the purge
vent port. There was no related instruction that authorized the capping procedure.
A NASA Headquarters investigation team produced a mishap investigation report
on April 27, 1990, with findings, observations and recommendations. The NASA
KSC Industrial Safety Office tracked the progress and documents that were used
to close out the recommendations in association with the mishap report. All
recommendations for implementation or closeout were assigned to the KSC Shuttle
Operations Directorate. Several recommendations on training and validation of OMI
procedures were delegated to JSC Engineering and the JSC Subsystem Manager
via a KSC Director's letter dated August 10, 1990. Seven findings with
recommendations and 12 observations with recommendations were addressed in
the investigation team's report. There was a total of 26 recommendations which
were considered "closed"
A detailed review of the recommendations by the Shuttle Processing Review Team
concluded the documentation reflected satisfactory closeout rationale but require
reevaluation of the effectiveness of the corrective action implementation.
For example, the investigation report recommended "System training and
knowledge should be made a part of certification requirements for all technicians
and quality inspectors and should be one of the primary considerations to pay
increases and promotions. System training should be made available during off-
shift hours."
Familiarization training (200-level course) on the fuel cell by the contractor is
provided to technicians and QC's. This is a 2.5 hour course. Based on discussions
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with system engineers, technicians, the trainer and QC's, the familiarization course
is not equivalent to "system training." System training is taught (8 hours, 300-
level course). There are no plans to provide the 300-level fuel cell system training
course to QC's. There is an on the job training (OJT) fuel cell task list for
technicians to complete under the instructions of an experienced person, this
typically takes 1-2 years to become fully competent. Technicians and QC's are
certified for critical tasks, but there are no plans to certify or dedicate technicians
or QC personnel on the fuel cell system.
The investigation report also recommended "When new control rooms are provided,
they should be located within the Orbiter Processing Facilities (OPF)."
There are no control rooms in the OPF, they are still in the Launch Control Center
(LCC). A Processing Control Center building was built to house control rooms, but
a joint NASA/contractor decision was made to not move the control rooms to the
OPF.
The report recommended "Training should be designated as a separate and major
functional entity at the same level as the engineering, operations, logistics, and
quality groups within the Lockheed organization." Lockheed training is under
logistics and there is no plan to implement the recommendation. The joint
NASA/contractor decision was made to not move training out of logistics.
It is recognized that these were recommendations and not directions, and NASA/
contractor decisions were made to implement them to the degree agreed on.
However, this Review Team recommends the closeout reports be updated to reflect
those decisions and agreements so that audit and review teams understand the
basis for closeout.
A second Orbiter fuel cell mishap occurred on August 12, 1991. A KSC
investigation board published a mishap investigation report on December 4, 1991.
The mishap occurred on the Orbiter Atlantis, 0V-104, when increased helium
pressure was inadvertently ingested into the fuel cell 02 supply causing a sudden
performance loss by fuel cells 2 and 3 subsequently resulting in the loss of power
to the Orbiter buses B and C. Loss of fuel cell power necessitated the
implementation of the Emergency Power Down Procedure. The emergency
procedure did not address the loss of multiple fuel cells with no vehicle ground
power and, therefore, did not accomplish the required isolation of Fuel Cells 2 and
3 from the Orbiter main buses. Therefore, there was no power available to drive
the fuel cell 2 and 3 main bus motor switches to the open (isolate) position. No
one was injured. OMl's have been revised to power down the more powerful fuel
24
cell bus last. Interface procedures with payload power requirements were reviewed
and appear to be adequate. Closeout of the associated recommendations from the
fuel cell power down investigation report do not present a concern and are
considered adequate to preclude recurrence. However, improved systems training
would be beneficial.
3. OXYGEN ANALYZER IN EXTERNAL TANK INTER TANK
An 02 analyzer was found inside the inter tank cavity of the ET on STS-57. The
analyzer had been installed per OMI T5048, step 03-005, when the stack was in
the VAB. The analyzer should have been removed before closeout in the VAB and
routed to SPC Safety per step 03-009. Removal was stamped off by the
technician. The temporary door was closed, lead integrity seals applied and the
stack was rolled to the pad with 02 analyzer still inside.
The OMI states under "special Instructions": "Ingress/Egress logs are not required
for items controlled by this OMI." However, this procedure for safety equipment
providesa single point failure. Management stated that the meter would have been
found during the prelaunch walk down.
The corrective action taken as a result of this incident stated this was a discipline
problem and management should stress strict adherence to procedures. The OMI
has been rewritten to separate the tasks. A plan is being generated to control all
safety equipment. This Team recommends that requirements be revised to list all
safety equipment on the Temporary Installation Record (TIR) or use the bar code
systems to provide a check and balance to assure non-flight hardware is removed
from the vehicle.
4. VAB CRANE INCIDENTS
Preliminary Evaluation Reports 019-92 and 038-92 written on March 18, 1992, and
August 11, 1992, respectively, documented unexpected movements of the 250
ton cranes in the VAB. Preliminary evaluation of the March 18 incident attributed
it to an unknown cause. Several precautionary actions were taken. These included
procedure changes, a potentiometer was changed, different springs were installed
in the joy sticks, test team discipline was emphasized, a checklist was added to the
planning and a sneak circuit analysis of drive systems was performed.
When the second crane incident occurred on August 11, 1992, a formal Mishap
Investigation Board was formed to investigate and determine proper corrective
action. The primary cause was determined to be erratic output from the Metadyne
controller. Corrective action was to design and install solid state control systems
in the 250 and 175 ton VAB cranes and to provide different cleaning procedures
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for the Metadyne equipment that was not modified. The primary cause corrective
action also remedied the first contributing cause.
A contributing cause to the mishap was repeated "funnies" that had previously
occurred during crane operations and were not communicated properly. Procedure
changes have been made to correct this. The technician felt the actions were
proper and would remedy the problems.
All corrective actions were found to be implemented except for the hoist controller
on the 250 ton crane number 2. These will be completed immediately following
STS-51 stacking in mid June. On-site discussions with the crane electronic
technicians and observation of the cranes themselves showed action were
complete as documented.
E. SPECIFIC SUBJECTS REVIEWED
1. SAFETY
It is the unanimous consensus of this Team that safety continues to be the
number one priority in Shuttle processing operations at KSC. No major
safety concerns were surfaced during the review. However, there were
some concerns identified that warrant further investigation by KSC to
preclude the possibility of a mishap. These are summarized as follows:
a. Workers in the Orbiter Aft Compartment
The technicians, engineers and quality control personnel voiced similar
complaints that purge air being piped into the Orbiter aft compartment
makes it extremely difficult to hear required communications. The
problem appears to be exacerbated by the length of time a person is
in the aft. Personnel stated they have difficulty hearing
communications and the loud speakers that sound warnings.
Additional concerns were expressed over the lighting conditions in the
aft compartment. Portable lights have been provided but electric
cords strung into the compartment create a potential for accident.
Noise and lighting problems in the aft have been a concern since
STS-I. Although studies have been done on noise and lighting, and
some changes have been made, no effective method for solving the
concerns has been found. Bullhorn/warbler systems have been added
as a result of employee concerns and oxygen deficiency monitors are
in place to mitigate hazards.
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Rocketdyne engineers, technicians and quality personnel stated that
close calls have occurred while working in the aft compartment.
Though it was not possible to fully substantiate these claims, it is
apparent from discussions with personnel that they believe these
types of incidents have occurred. However, no mishap reports for
these types of incidents were found. Procedures are in place to
prevent these types of occurrences, but the difficulty personnel have
hearing warnings while in the aft may be the primary problem.
NASA and SPC must continue to address the concerns held by
personnel working in the aft compartment to assure they are given
additional visibility. Rocketdyne and SPC should continue to
encourage all personnel working in the aft compartment to report any
safety concerns and close calls. These concerns need to be surfaced
and aggressively pursued. The Design Center should evaluate
engineering changes that will reduce the noise level from the purge air
system in the aft compartment. In the interim, SPC should continue
its efforts to improve conditions. Visual means of warning personnel
should be considered. The engineer conducting the task must ensure
all personnel understand the task and the implication of all deviations.
During critical operations, all personnel in the aft compartment should
be on the OIS headset. The type of headset being used should be
evaluated to determine if a different type/make could provide greater
confidence in the quality of communications. Before movement,
purges or other hazardous operations are performed, all personnel
must be advised and verification that they heard the warnings must
be received.
Orbiter Processing Facility
A technician in the OPF stated he has tried for over a year to obtain
a four foot high work platform for the chin panel area. The team
noticed he had a two foot high platform with a four gallon milk crate
on top of it in order to reach. He stated that an individual fell off the
top of the crate and an Engineering Support Request (ESR) had been
submitted for a new work stand. He understood there was some
delay due to the need to generate drawings for the platform.
Another technician indicated safety ropes that had "Danger" or
"Hazard' signs on them had been taken down with the signs in place
and hung to the side. Safety installs and removes the signs.
Operations personnel had been delegated the responsibility to put up
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the ropes. The technicians stated they were not clear as to who
removes the ropes.
Safety should be totally responsible for putting up and taking down
barriers and signs for hazardous operations. Signs should indicate
who in safety is responsible for the sign and how they can be
reached.
c. Engine Shop
The number of main engines (16) in process in the VAB engine shop
area represent National resources valued at almost one billion dollars.
A major mishap during SRB stacking could destroy these resources.
SRB stacking normally occurs on second shift, and personnel not
involved with stacking are kept out of hazardous areas. However,
because of extensive engine activity recently, engine operations have
been impacted by stacking operations. Funds have been approved to
build a new engine facility outside the VAB.
d. SCAPE Suits
Interviews with SCAPE operations personnel revealed that many
technicians and QC's are not comfortable with the existing Category
1,4 and 6 SCAPE suits. Several instances of torn suits and opened
zippers/closure seals were cited which were detected on completion
of an operation.
While most of the SCAPE suit incidents are reported, at least three
unreported incidents were discussed where hazardous materials were
actually introduced into the suit. One of these occurred when a
technician twisted suddenly causing the relief valve to allow N204into
the suit. Although training classes and procedures recognize this
condition and train personnel on proper use of the suits, SCAPE
operations personnel feel there are instances where this type of action
is unavoidable and a design change to the relief valves is required.
Interviews with Life Support personnel revealed that they are
concerned about unreported SCAPE suit problems. Life Support
personnel have recognized zipper flap closure problems in the
Category 6 suits and joined with KSC Safety to limit the use of these
suits to special operations under interim controlled procedures while
they investigated possible solutions with the manufacturer.
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There appears to be general lack of communication between personnel
performing SCAPE operations and Life Support personnel. Personnel
performing the operations feel that they are not consulted or informed
of changes being made in suit manufacture and design. Life Support
personnel were unaware of any legitimate problems with Category 1
and 4 suits and are genuinely concerned with incidents going
unreported.
Additionally, the original SAA's on all SCAPE suits need to be redone
with new ground rules that emphasize the particular importance of
these suits and specify that this Ground Support Equipment (GSE) is
unique and should have a unique analysis. Also, the Systems
Assurance Analysis (SAA's) should reflect recent design modifications
to make the suits safer. Safety should review the hazard analysis to
assure that they meet the current requirements. In addition, existing
procedures need to be reviewed or new procedures need to be
established to ensure that issues that are identified by all users are
presented to Life Support personnel and that the disposition of these
items is conveyed to the originator.
2. Tool Control
The KSC Space Shuttle Tool Control Program and SPC Tool Control
Program have been dramatically improved. Tool boxes with "shadow box"
inserts for each tool have been purchased for all areas of the OPF.
Contents are serialized to the box and are inventoried at the beginning and
end of each shift. Damaged or missing items are reported to the
supervisor. General tools, gauges and disposable items have been collected
from the floor and can be checked out from the tool crib.
SPC is incrementally supplying all areas with new tools and boxes. The
OPF is complete and boxes at the pad are being modified and furnished.
Some workers expressed their concern that the OPF had new tools and the
VAB and pad did not. Technicians and quality personnel in some areas
voiced their frustration with the difficulty they have in obtaining good
quality tools and hand held instruments. Management should continue to
survey operations personnel to determine what tools and equipment are
necessary to accomplish the work and optimize efficiency and
accountability for tools. Management needs to assure everyone that new
tools will be supplied according to a master plan.
One area requires review and definition of the tool control program. The
Payload Changeout Room (PCR) at the pad has three different disciplines
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and various contractors or experiment principle investigators that require
access to the Orbiter. It is not apparent that there is a common
material/tool control program for PCR operations. KSC should develop a
memorandum of understanding for PCR material and tool control and
implement procedures rapidly. Payload personnel have been extremely
conscientious about tool control in the PCR.
The tool control program does not apply to safety equipment such as the
oxygen analyzer that was found in the inter tank of the external tank on
STS-57. The Team recommends the procedures be revised to require all
safety equipment to be listed on the Temporary Installation Record (TIR) or
use the bar code system to provide a check and balance to assure non-
flight hardware is removed from the vehicle.
3. Structured Surveillance
Due to the STS-51L incident and the subsequent requirements for return to
flight, quality assurance inspections were greatly increased. Since the
initial return to flight missions, NASA KSC has looked for ways to improve
efficiency and effectiveness by reducing quality assurance's reliance on
inspection.
Significant increases in productivity and efficiency can be achieved by
reducing reliance on hands-on inspection, placing more responsibility with
individuals who are actually performing the task and implementing
statistically based work sampling to determining areas needing
improvement. The primary objective of the Structured Surveillance Pilot
Program is to demonstrate the gains in efficiency that can be realized by
reducing dependence on inspection and more effectively utilizing the
expertise and judgment of the highly skilled technician work force. The
approach to be used in achieving that objective involves a combination of
traditional inspection activities and statistical sampling strategies.
Structured Surveillance is a concept which provides for implementing a
NASA-wide initiative to improve the product and process quality of all
NASA KSC operations. Under the program, quality assurance of both the
Criticality 1 Hardware and functional Criticality Requirements 1 (1, 1R, and
1S for contractors) and Criticality 2 and 2R is supposed to continue to be
accomplished by an independent inspection. Verification of Criticality 3 and
non-critical OMRS requirements will be accomplished by the technician
performing the actual work. Inspection by the quality assurance
organization will also be used to provide additional confidence when
warranted.
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The primary goal is to accomplish an increase in efficiency while ensuring
that safety, reliability, and the quality of the hardware and software is
maintained. This will be accomplished by empowering the technicians who
perform the work with the tools to attain "First Time Quality", thus
reducing the (1) time to perform the work, (2) waste and (3) total man-
hours.
The change in the quality assurance program is a shift away from
inspection of an individual's work and focuses on monitoring and measuring
the processes. Techniques, such as qualitative and quantitative
surveillance methods will be used to establish a closed loop continuous
quality assurance process for monitoring assurance and process
improvement and corrective action implementation.
Opinion of the shop personnel in the OPF, VAB and pad seem to be split.
Most felt that placing more responsibility on the person doing the work is
a move in the right direction, however, the personnel did not fully
understand the program. Management should provide shop level personnel
with more details about the program and help them understand the concept
of first time quality.
Even though some inconsistencies were identified, Phase I of the
Structured Surveillance Pilot Program was a success. All organizations
learned from their participation and made improvements which simplified
Phase II of the pilot program. Therefore, the benefits derived from full
implementation of the Structured Surveillance Program can be substantial.
The potential exists for an oversight during placement or deletion of critical
inspection points in OMl's because not all design center CIL retention
rationale and hazard controls are "linked" to OMRSD's. On January 17,
1991, a Change Request was approved by the Shuttle Program Manager
deleting inspection requirements from the OMRSD when they are defined
by released engineering. A review of the process being used by Quality
Engineers to place or delete OMI inspections shows the CIL retention
rationale and hazards are not required to be reviewed to identify critical
inspections in KSC work authorization documents (WADS). For critical
inspections, where the CIL and hazard controls are contained in Level III
Orbiter installation drawings rather than in the OMRSD, the Quality
Engineers do not have a means of identifying which inspections are critical
and must closed-loop accounting. These are considered minor (criticality
3) inspections by Quality Engineering subject to deletion under the
guidelines of Structured Surveillance. In addition, for integrated OMl's,
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changes are being made by other than the responsible organization (i.e.,
LSOC changed SSME inspections without Rocketdyne input). The
engineers doing these reviews consider determining the criticality of
inspection to be the Quality Assurance organization's responsibility and do
not intentionally verify retention of critical WADS were in compliance with
the requirement to maintain independent inspection.
NASA KSC and SPC Quality Assurance must continue to ensure that
OMRSD requirements derived from CIL or Hazard Report acceptance
rationale are maintained and closed or accountability is achieved. In order
for KSC to do this, the Design Centers must provide these requirements.
This must include use of the CIL retention rationale and Hazard Analyses
to identify critical inspection requirements. NASA SR&QA management
should take immediate action to assure that no adverse effects on safety
and mission success resulted from the deletion of inspections in the WADS
as a result of OMRSD changes. As an interim measure, the cognizant
Engineers at the Design Centers should review all inspection points for KSC
WADS to assure no omission of critical requirements. The Shuttle Program
Manager (JSC) should reassess the impact of the Change Request that
deleted OMRSD requirements that are defined by released engineering.
4. Problem Reports
For the period October 5, 1990, to April 30, 1993, 49,013 KSC problem
reports (PR's) were analyzed for trends. More specifically, those problem
reports that listed workmanship as the cause were reviewed. Since the
beginning of 1992, the trend in total PR's has been decreasing from about
2200 per month to the current 1200 per month. Likewise, workmanship
PR's have decreased from about 390 to 170 per month for the same
period. The previous year, 1991, showed an increasing monthly trend in
total and workmanship PR's. Some examples of improper use of the
workmanship cause codes were noted.
It is recommended that a program of continuous improvement for the rate
of workmanship PR's for subsystems and components be established.
Standard repair procedures and Statistical Process Control should be
investigated as methods to reduce the level and variability of workmanship
errors and to track workmanship as different initiatives and programs are
instituted. Additional efforts should be looked at that approach human
error from a scientific and engineering aspect to determine root causes.
Contract award fees should contain additional emphasis on the accuracy
and efficiency in reporting problem reports.
32
5. Mishap Reports
NASA and SPC need to emphasize the requirements and procedures for
reporting all safety incidents and concerns, especially close calls. For those
reports that do not qualify as a PER,feedback to the originator should be
provided as to exactly why the report was not forwarded to the IERB.
Discussions with working level personnel revealed that they are either
unfamiliar or uncertain about the criteria and procedures for reporting safety
incidents (PERS). Additionally, many personnel expressed the view that
reporting safety concerns will either be viewed negatively or will not result
in any meaningful response.
SPC uses a PER as the reporting mechanism for safety incidents. The
IERB/SOAG has the role of reviewing PER's for appropriate action.
However, working level people have stated that they have initiated a PER
only to indirectly discover that it had been rejected and never sent to the
IERB. No feedback has been provided to these personnel about their
concern resulting in a negative perception of the entire safety reporting
system. Software and console incidents/concerns are not reported as
PER's but are usually documented and dispositioned as Interim Problem
Reports (IPR's).
For the above period, 612 mishaps were reviewed for trends, 177 were
classified as close call mishaps. Only 78 mishaps were associated with
flight hardware. Overall, the trend in mishaps shows variability from month
to month, but the level remains relatively constant, about 20 per month.
Close call mishaps average 6 per month. Mishaps fall largely into the "C"
category - $25K to $250K damage or lost time/restricted duty. The fuel
cell emergency power down was the only significant mishap, category A,
for the time period addressed. Data indicates the following causes for all
mishaps:
Human factors 66%
Equipment failure 8%
Procedures 5%
Other 21%
For flight hardware associated mishaps, the causes are:
Human factors 32%
Procedures 26%
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Equipment failure 12%
Communication 11%
Handling 6%
Other 13%
As with problem reports, structured root cause analysis of human errors
should be investigated to implement a continuous improvement program.
6. Training and Certification
The SPC Training and Certification Department is doing an excellent job.
An automated scheduling system and better training aids would improve
their efficiency. The critical skills training and certification program is well
managed. Course material is considered to be current and is tailored to
specific student needs. Technical training statistics through May 1993
show that approximately 80% of the training requested is approved and
scheduled. Student to instructor ratios are proper. The year-to-date "no-
show" rate is about 26% which is considered to be excessive. This rate
represents and estimated loss of over 2,000 student hours per month.
The need for improved skills training and expertise has been highlighted by
several mishap investigation teams as the contributing cause to processing
incidents. A review of the SPC IERB findings confirmed this need.
Technicians and QC personnel, both SPC and NASA, expressed a desire for
increased systems knowledge and proficiency. Their concern is that a
specific task may be understood, but how it relates to the overall function
of the system is not clear. Training relative to their areas of responsibility
should be evaluated to consider expanding their systems knowledge.
Training and certification is provided to the OMRSD requirements, but the
OMRSD inspection requirements are not definitive enough for corrosion
inspection. A special working group is addressing this issue Improved NDE
techniques are being investigated. A review of as-run structural inspection
OMl's indicates the inspectors using approved techniques were not able to
detect active corrosion on the orbiter wing and vertical tail. Subsequent
reviews of hardware by structural engineers using more in-depth techniques
detected the corrosion and provided appropriate disposition and repair.
Corrosion detection and control is a critical skill that requires better
definition. The Training and Certification Board should continue to consult
with industry experts, NASA's Langley Research Center, the Navy Safety
Center and Naval Air Systems Command to develop an improved training
and certification program. The OMRSD requirements should be revised to
specify in-depth corrosion inspection criteria.
34
The Training Department currently has the Naval Education Service Center
assisting in the development of a Distributive Computer Based Training
System. This is believed to be of great benefit. Expansion of this system
is strongly encouraged.
7. Quality Assurance
SPC and NASA Quality Assurance organizations are required to cover a
wide variety of complex tasks and operations. The ratio of SPC inspectors
to technicians is approximately one to four. NASA QC has approximately
one inspector for every four SPCinspectors. This Team's findings in a few
areas indicate a need for increased emphasis in some aspects of the quality
assurance function. These include training and certification, structured
surveillance, QA inputs to processing paper, QA stamp integrity, audits,
trending and corrective action. Training and structured surveillance are
addressed elsewhere in this report.
The QA inspectors are concerned about having little or no input to the
preparation of the processing paper. Quality Engineers have some input.
in many cases, the same "paper problems" keep recurring in spite of
numerous deviations being generated to correct deficiencies. Procedures
that are unclear detract from the ability to control quality and prevent
"escapes" in flight hardware.
Historically, there have been several occurrences of work being bought-off
or stamped as complete although it was not actually performed. This has
raised concerns relative to the stamp as warranty. There is a difference
between "verify" and "witness" inspection buy-offs. The use of both
quality and technicians stamps must be carefully reviewed. Administrative
usage of stamps (i.e., paper review) should be minimized. Emphasis must
be placed on each individual stamp as warranty that work was performed
and was performed correctly. Stamps must be a personal certification.
The system used to highlight areas in need of in-depth quality audits or
increased surveillance should be improved. Recurring problems with the
scape suits, VAB cranes, hardware impact by access platforms could have
benefitted from identification by audits. The audit system could be
improved by focusing on areas where data shows a need for increased
attention.
Use of trending appears to be trend reporting rather than trend analysis to
help detect root cause problems and to identify areas to effect corrective
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actions. Certain work areas are trending by collecting, tabulating, and
reporting data. There is need to improve the system to collect and analyze
trending information related to processes which have been identified as
needing improvement. Additionally, incorrect or inaccurate problem
descriptions in the PRACA system inhibits the trending utility of the data
base for analyzing, resolving and preventing recurrence of non-
conformances. Trend analysis needs should be identified by the user
community including floor level personnel, the design center engineers,
management and vendors.
F. VOLUNTARY INTERVIEW RESULTS:
The Space Shuttle Program has continuously improved since the Challenger
accident. Great strides in efficiency, costs, and schedule have evolved in recent
years. We are flying the cleanest and most reliable vehicles ever.
The Space Shuttle is a unique and extremely complex vehicle, and the uniqueness
and complexity is carried over into the management and processing for each flight.
It was not the intent of this Review Team to cast doubt on the efficiency in the
safe accomplishment of our Space Flight goals. It is the opinion of this Review
Team that the overall performance and success of the Space Shuttle Program is
exemplary. Our observations and recommendations are intended to allow the
Shuttle Processing Team to further enhance their enviable record. Many of our
observations are reflective of the perceptions at the technician levels. The
perceptions that were expressed to the Team do not reflect upper management
policies in the area of reporting mistakes.
There is a perception in some work areas, among the technicians, that reporting
mistakes results in punitive action. Punitive actions are reflected in individual
performance records and the fear is that noted mistakes will lead to loss of
employment. Corrective action is also viewed as an overreaction from management
and it usually results in additional procedures and verifications.
Communication is felt to be limited to/from the technician level to the upper level
management. The technicians are a competent and motivated group with regard
to "getting the job done". However, they do not feel as though their concerns are
heard by upper management. It is the conclusion of this Review Team that these
perceptions need to be addressed. This conclusion was drawn on the basis of
personal as well as group interviews of hundreds of personnel and documentation
obtained that indicate the following:
1. In some work areas there is a tendency to not report problems, close calls and
incidents because there is fear of reprisal.
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2. Problems that are discovered, such as the lost pliers, result in criticism directed
at the hands-on technicians who are the people responsible for the Agency's
success. This is not common to all areas nor is it an isolated issue.
3. Controls effected as a result of these problems are considered excessive by the
work force and in their opinion have resulted in a slowdown in processing in some
areas.
4. Technicians and engineers have developed an in-depth knowledge of their work
and understand the hardware systems they are responsible for; however, in their
opinion, the quality control and safety people do not have an appropriate degree of
systems knowledge in many cases. The Quality personnel interviewed indicated
they desire more systems training.
5. Technicians have discovered or devised efficient ways to perform work. They
improve procedures in order to do the job more efficiently or correctly. They stated
that the same problems exist in the paper for each flow. The number of deviations,
changes documents and engineering orders attached to documents make the work
extremely complicated. They follow the paper to the best of their ability; however,
some procedural errors occur.
6. It became apparent to the Team that each organization, be it NASA, LSOC,
Thiokol, SPS, LSS, etc., exhibit corporate pride and competitiveness; however they
tend to sometimes view themselves as separate entities. In no way is this to say
the work force is not dedicated and performing at a high level to achieve the overall
goals. Within each area high quality work is generally the norm, but there is room
for more cooperation between work area organizations.
The Review Team found that for many incidents investigated, someone was aware
of the problem or of the potential for a problem but either felt powerless to remedy
the situation, reported it but it didn't get worked, or it was simply let go without
being pursued. Generally, this was the input from the floor level personnel.
Feedback to the originator of PER's that do not qualify as IERB items should be
provided so personnel understand why their report was not accepted.
G. CONCLUSIONS:
The following are the overall conclusions reached by the Team:
1. Safety continues to be the number one priority in Shuttle processing operations
and confidence in processing operations procedures and personnel is well placed.
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2. The Shuttle Operations Team has developed a comprehensive methodology to
continuously improve quality while reducing labor costs. Some areas observed
seemed to excel in continuous improvement more than others and are models to
emulate. The Orbiter tile shop, the tire shop, the Hypergolic Maintenance Facility
(HMF) and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) processing areas are considered
examples. Teamwork, new efficiencies in operations, facility improvements and
automation techniques have been combined to result in record processing quantities
with continuing improvement in quality and a low incidence of mishaps.
3. The underlying causes for recent incidents and close calls during Shuttle
processing at KSC as determined through a review of documentation is attributable
to human factors, equipment failures and procedures. The predominant causes
(66%) of all mishaps is human factors. For flight hardware incidents human factors
were responsible for 32% of the mishaps and procedures caused 26% of the
mishaps. The actions taken as result of these incidents were reviewed in detail.
The corrective actions in most cases were determined to be adequate and had, in
fact, been implemented. However, in some cases, implementation was still in
process or budget restrictions and revised methods of operation were stated to be
the reason for not implementing the recommendations.
4. The recommendations of the John Young Report and the Gene Thomas Report
have not been fully implemented. These were recommendations and not directives.
The degree of implementation is subject to management judgement and recognized
is the fact that NASA policies, budgets, and management systems have changed
since these recommendations were made.
5. The Team concluded that multi-discipline team building has improved; however,
there is a need to expand it to all areas. The task team leader concept, including
the training and assignment of dedicated technicians and quality control personnel
is not yet complete. Engineering support to the work site needs to be readdressed.
Efficiencies achieved in non-critical operations have placed even more responsibility
for the quality of the work on the technicians performing the task. Systems are in
place to reward special performance and accomplishments. However, because of
reductions in force and recent disciplinary actions associated with incidents that
received disproportionate media attention, there is a perception that has developed
among the work force that making mistakes results in punitive action. There is a
fear that noted mistakes will lead to loss of employment. Therefore, there is a
tendency to not report problems, close calls and incidents because of the of the
fear of reprisal. The Review Team found no evidence that disciplinary action was
taken inappropriately.
6. Some NASA and SPC technicians and Quality Control personnel desire more
detailed knowledge of systems and subsystems to which they are assigned to
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verify procedural compliance. Some Quality Control personnel interviewed
expressed concern that their areas of responsibility are too broad. Concerns were
also expressed relative to lack of involvement by quality inspectors in generating
processing paper and planning tasks to be accomplished. The pilot Structured
Surveillance Program is complete and full implementation is in process. However,
some inconsistencies and misinterpretations were expressed by the technicians and
quality control personnel. Corrosion inspection requirements in the OMRSD are
being met; however, deficiencies were noted in the adequacy of the process used
to detect corrosion on the Orbiter.
7. Not all Design Center(s), CIL and Hazard acceptance criteria involved in KSC
processing are "linked" to the OMRS creating the potential for an oversight during
selection of inspection requirements in work authorization documents. A change
request approved by the Program Manager allowed deletion of CIL and Hazard
related inspection requirements in the OMRSD if defined by released engineering.
8. The category "A" mishap on the fuel cell resulted in an Investigation Board
Report with 26 recommendations. The Team found the documentation for close
out of the recommendations reflected satisfactory rationale but the corrective
action implementation requires reevaluation and documentation update to reflect
management decisions.
9. Some personnel feel their concerns about hazards are not being addressed.
Workers in Orbiter aft compartment indicated concerns with lighting and noise
levels. SCAPE suit problems continue to occur. Although significant management
attention has been placed on SCAPE suits, some of the work force feel that known
design deficiencies have not been adequately corrected. Close calls were stated
to have occurred which have not been reported.
H. OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS:
The Team assessed the results of their review and developed the overall
recommendations summarized below:
1. Management should continue to be a positive influence on safety improvements
and continue to respond to the constant challenge of communicating with the work
force to ensure perceptions accurately reflect management policies. Top
management, mid-level managers and first-line supervisors need to continue to
communicate with their subordinates to allay their fears that reporting problems,
close calls and mistakes leads to reprisals and disciplinary action.
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2. KSC and SPC management should study closely the areas of excellence that
have evidenced themselves and capture the lessons learned and successes
achieved in order to apply these successful techniques to all processing operations.
3. KSC and SPC should establish additional continuous improvement teams to
investigate root causes for incidents and problems attributable to human factors.
Feedback should be solicited from the work force as to solutions for problems.
4. The SPC closures for the recommendations of both the John Young Report and
the Gene Thomas Report need to be reassessed by NASA to see if they are still
applicable and reflect the current Agency directions. If they are found to be
applicable, they should continue to be implemented and regular audits should be
performed to assure compliance. If found to be not applicable, the closeout reports
should be amended to reflect the current policies of operation.
5. Multi-discipline team building needs to continue to be implemented, especially
in the VAB and at the launch pads. The task team leader concept, the on-site
engineering support and the dedicated technician and inspector approach need to
be integrated into an overall strategy for critical operations. KSC management,
both NASA and contractor, should continue to do as much as possible to provide
an environment that encourages integrated teamwork and cooperation between the
various organizations on-site.
6. NASA and SPC should continue to review and update their training and
certification programs for technicians and quality control personnel. Quality Control
personnel should have adequate involvement in generating the processing paper
and planning the tasks to be accomplished. KSC should assure that Quality
inspectors have appropriate training in critical systems. Emphasis must be placed
on each individual stamp as a warranty that the work was performed correctly.
The system used to identify areas in need of in-depth quality audits or increased
surveillance could be improved. Improved trend analysis, in addition to trend
reporting, would be beneficial to help identify recurring problem areas requiring
corrective action. The requirements for in-depth corrosion inspection criteria need
to be reviewed by the Design Center. Training and certification should be improved
appropriately.
7. To preserve the integrity of risk assessment and risk management activities,
Space Shuttle program management must ensure that KSC Operations and
Maintenance Requirements Specifications Document (OMRSD) derived from CIL or
Hazard Report acceptance rationale are properly identified to ensure independent
inspection, closed-loop accounting of work completion, and proper application.
NASA JSC, KSC and Space Shuttle program management should determine the
validity of the KSC situation and if similar situations exist at Design Center
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contractors' plants and initiate corrective action as soon as possible. The Space
Shuttle Program Manager (JSC) should reassess the impact of the Change Request
that deleted OMRSD requirements that are defined by released engineering.
8. The process for verifying implementation of recommendations in mishap
investigation reports needs to be reviewed to assure corrective actions documented
in the closeouts are effected.
9. NASA and SPC should continue to address concerns about hazards held by
personnel working in the Orbiter aft compartment to assure they are given proper
visibility and are aggressively pursued. The Design Center should assist in these
efforts by considering design changes that would reduce the noise level from the
purge air system. NASA and SPC need to continue to address the cause for the
incidents on SCAPE suits. Communication between SCAPE Operations and Life
Support personnel need to be improved. A means should be established to flag
trends and resolve issues such as the number of scape problems. Management
needs to evaluate the system for reporting close calls to assure employee
participation is not discouraged and safety concerns are properly addressed.
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